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VALUE PROJECTION AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Dr. Douglas Macdonald
Strategic Studies Institute
The controversies over the Bush administration’s “doctrine” of promoting democracy as a
long-term goal of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) have raised once again that hardy
perennial in the debate over American foreign policy: value projection. The debate juxtaposes
two basic positions: the Jeffersonian idea that the United States should, when possible, serve as
an active agent for the spread of democratic values in the world, and the Washingtonian idea
that we should serve as a model for the rest of the world by developing democracy at home, not
by taking actions to foster it abroad. Both groups of early Americans were children of the
Enlightenment: they saw liberal, republican government as universally beneficial and desirable.
The question was how best to support its development in the world.
Not surprisingly, there has been much controversy between the two schools over the
periodic attempts to promote democracy actively, especially since the presidency of Woodrow
Wilson. Active attempts to promote democratic values often have taken place during or at the
end of wars. It is during those periods that the structure of the international order is in flux, and
opportunities appear to present themselves. Wilson’s war to “make the world safe for
democracy” by ending autarchy, Franklin Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms,” and the value-laden
rhetoric and policies of Cold War presidents such as Harry Truman, John Kennedy, Jimmy
Carter, and Ronald Reagan, and now President George W. Bush and Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice in the GWOT, demonstrate that the desire for value projection has not gone
away. Nor has it lost any of its controversy.
There is neither time nor space to settle the controversy here. In fact, the controversies
probably are not definitively “solvable” at all, since they are steeped in varying views of
America’s role in the world. In the discussion of whether the United States can support
democratic reforms successfully externally, however, both the Jeffersonians and
Washingtonians have given in to an ethnocentric view of measurement of the success or failure
of value projection. Specifically, the measurement of success or failure for both has concentrated
too much on the concept of elections and political institution-building. Both are important, but
not exclusively so. In short, Americans tend to measure success by comparing the target nations
to themselves. Given cultural and historical differences between Americans and other countries,
this practice defies rational explanation beyond an excessive belief in the universality of our
own model of democracy.
Theorists of democratization sometimes make a distinction between the formal, institutional
aspects of democracy (constitutions, elections, etc.), and substantive, existential aspects (the
promotion of civic society, labor reform, land reform, etc.) But the best way to measure
democratization is by conflating the two under the concept of general democratic reform. There
are three general characteristics of democratic reform: 1) a change in governmental policy; 2) a
change in the nature of the relationship between the governors and the governed; and, perhaps
most importantly in those parts of the world still in transition from traditional agrarian
societies, 3) a devolution of economic, military, political, and/or social power within the society.
In this view, elections are democratic reforms because they devolve control of governance to a
broader spectrum of people. But so is land reform, for the same reason in socio-economic form.
This standard also introduces the concept of the relative degree of democratic progress that
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provides a more realistic yardstick than comparison to societies that have been democratizing
for centuries like our own (and which still have a way to go in many respects—a little humility
would not hurt here.)
Suffrage can offer some examples of incremental progress: universal male suffrage is a
democratic improvement over suffrage for a propertied class; universal male/female suffrage is
a democratic improvement over male suffrage alone. Both are democratic reforms by this
definition, although the second is relatively more democratic than the first. And the first is a
progressive democratic reform compared to what preceded it. Political progress comes
incrementally, and should be measured that way. Thus those who criticize early Americans for
giving a limited number of white males the vote, but excluding minorities and women, miss the
historical significance of the American Revolution. Giving anyone the vote in the 18th century
was a revolutionary act. Through subsequent incremental progress, we are far more democratic
than we were then.
This is a return to an older definition of democracy that sees it as a never-ending process,
not a particularly defined end-state. This was also the way we carried out the democratic
reforms in Italy, Germany, and Japan following World War II (for example, Japanese women
did not get the vote until 1957). Allowing formerly excluded societal groups to participate
meaningfully in political life is also a democratic reform under this definition (for example, the
civil rights reforms of the 1960s in the United States).
Thus the definitions of democratic progress we utilize in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere
need to be more elastic and inclusive. From this pragmatic point of view, the recent elections in
Afghanistan and Iraq clearly did not solve the problems facing those countries, and perhaps
created new ones. Yet with all their problems, they introduced the idea—the potential
possibility—of democratic self-governance. They therefore represent democratic progress,
especially compared to the regimes that preceded them, even though they are not yet
democratic societies in any meaningful sense.
When fashioning our economic and other policies in those countries, we should use a
similar standard of incremental devolution in all sectors of social life, not just political
institution-building. Creating a plan to let every Iraqi share directly in a part of the nation’s oil
wealth (some planners have mentioned the Alaskan model) would be democratic in this sense,
would likely be very popular and gain support for the democratic government, and would be a
downright revolutionary model in the Middle East. Terrorist attacks on the oil industry would
then be seen as attacks on the income of every Iraqi citizen.
Holding up fledgling democracies to the abstraction of some fully-developed—usually
utopian—model of democratic progress is self-defeating and creates excessive pessimism as one
only sees failure everywhere. It also accounts for much of the extreme criticism of U.S. foreign
policy as antidemocratic. Democratic reforms should be judged against the conditions that
preceded them, not according to an ultimate set of yet unobtainable goals. In the long run, of
course, the ideal result should animate goals and policies, but it must be implemented in an
imperfect and at times unforgiving reality.
Slow progress is still progress.
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